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The Motherhood Wage Penalty in America
Jennifer A. Boden
ABSTRACT. The difference in pay between mothers and otherwise comparable nonmothers is called the family gap. Mothers are paid less than non-mothers on average. Is
it because mothers are different than non-mothers or are mothers penalized because of
their decisions to have children? Previous studies have found that after controlling for
demographic and human capital characteristics, mothers are paid less than non-mothers
on average. This study uses 2008 American Community Survey data and finds evidence
that the family gap exists in the United States.

I. Introduction
Men are often paid more than women in the labor market. As women
have increased their work experience and education relative to men this
gender gap in pay has lessened but not completely disappeared. Various
explanations have been offered to explain the gender gap, and many
studies have tried to determine the causes. In recent years, gender gap
studies have shifted focus. Instead of looking at wage differences
between the genders, researchers have begun to look at wage differences
within genders. Research has shown that “married men, most of whom
have children, earn more than other men” (Waldfogel 1998, 143), and
mothers earn less than other women (Fuchs 1989, 35). The difference in
pay between parents and non-parents of the same gender is called the
family gap. This study will focus on the family-induced wage gap among
women.
Family gap studies are important for several reasons. First, if mothers
are penalized in terms of wages because of their fertility decisions, then
they may choose to participate less in the labor market. Fewer workers
produce less output. This harms society because lower levels of output
reduce the standard of living in a country. Second, well-raised children
can be seen as “public goods” (Avellar and Smock, 2003, 605) for which
the cost is “borne disproportionately by mothers” (Budig and England,
2001, 204). Children are our future work force, our future tax payers, and
our future innovators. Children are more likely to become productive
adults if they are raised in good home environments. If women earn less
because they have children, then more women with higher earnings
potential may opt to remain childless. Finally, if mothers are paid less
1
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than non-mothers on average and more mothers are divorced or single
than in years past, then mothers may be less able to support their children
without the aid of welfare. Welfare itself may exacerbate the problem
because some mothers may justify working fewer hours if they are able
to collect welfare; this lowers work experience and thus labor market
wages for these women (Budig and England 2001, 211).
A woman’s life is forever changed when she becomes a mother. Even
the dream of one day becoming a mother may influence a woman’s
educational and occupational choices. Once she becomes a mother is she
penalized in terms of wages because of the choices she made or simply
because she has children? Using empirical evidence, I control for
educational and occupational choice to find that children do indeed lower
a mother’s wages.

II. Literature Review
The wage gap between mothers and non-mothers may be attributed to
differences between the two groups of women or to discrimination. Some
of these differences may be measurable such as levels of education,
experience, and tenure (Budig and England 2001, 204). Other differences
are more difficult or impossible to measure directly but may still account
for part of the wage gap between mothers and non-mothers. The
willingness to trade higher wages for other benefits, for example, may
differ between the two groups of women (Budig and England 2001, 2004)
and is difficult to measure (Budig and England 2001, 220). It is also
possible that one of these groups may provide more effort or motivation
towards market labor. Employers may even discriminate against one
group or favor the other (Budig and England 2001, 2004). Previous
studies have attempted to explain the family gap. Researchers have found
that even after controlling for a variety of demographic and human capital
variables, a wage gap still exists (Waldfogel 1998, 143). This indicates
that women are penalized in the labor market for having children.
Mothers and non-mothers may choose to receive different amounts
of schooling (Anderson et al. 2002, 355). A woman who desires to marry
or have a family in the future may choose to reduce the overall amount of
schooling she receives believing that it will be unnecessary in her role as
a wife or mother (Fuchs 1989, 34). A mother may opt for less schooling
because of the timing of childbearing. If a woman has a child before she
finishes school, she may decide to drop out due to health or time and
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money constraints (Anderson et al., 2002, 355). It is possible for mothers
in this situation to increase their education by returning to school at a later
time, but many do not. The reasons behind this choice are extensive and
beyond the scope of this study. Because wages are expected to rise with
the level of education, mothers are expected to earn less in the labor
market if they invest less in their educations.
Waldfogel, using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and
data from the 1980 and 1991 National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS), finds
that education became more important in predicting wages of young men
and women (average age of 30 years) between 1980 and 1991.
Additionally, she reports that young women increased their average
amount of schooling during this period. Young mothers in particular may
not be able to keep up with this trend of increased education and would
therefore be penalized more in terms of wages (1998, 146).
Mothers are more likely to leave the labor market for extended
periods of time (Budig and England 2001, 204). The physical recovery
following childbirth requires some degree of maternity leave, and
pregnancy-induced illnesses may require extended periods of bed rest to
protect the health of the mother or child. Some mothers opt to leave the
labor market until the child goes to school or is older. Since wages are
expected to increase as work experience increases, reduced work
experience caused by absences from the labor market are expected to
reduce a mother’s wages.
Waldfogel’s OLS regressions compare the effect of work experience
on wages in 1980 to the effect in 1991. She finds that the coefficient on
work experience is 60% higher in 1991 than in 1980. This indicates the
increased importance of work experience in predicting wages during this
period (1998, 146). A woman who leaves the labor force lowers her work
experience and is expected to have lower wages as a result.
Even if a mother chooses to stay in the labor force following the birth
of her child, she may devote less time to her labor market activities
(Budig and England 2001, 204). Part-time work, for example, may be
more conducive to maintaining a well-functioning family. A mother who
finds more satisfaction from being at home and doesn’t need to work may
choose part-time market labor because she wants to have extra spending
money or sees it as a way to interact socially with other adults. In this
case, a mother works more hours than if she had chosen not to work at all,
but still less than she might have had she not had children. If the family
needs additional income, the mother, especially if she is the primary
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caregiver of the children, may have to choose between part-time
employment and increased absences at a full-time position. Hotchkiss
and Pitts find that women face a “sizable wage penalty for intermittent
labor-market activity” (2003, 236) and that both frequency and duration
of these absences affect this penalty (2003, 233). Part-time employment
specifically has been found to pay lower wages (Waldfogel 1997, 215).
Switching to part time work is not necessarily an option at every
workplace. A woman may be forced to leave her current employment in
order to obtain a part-time work schedule elsewhere. Staying in the labor
market is beneficial in that it raises a worker’s experience, but staying
with a specific company is beneficial in a slightly different way. Firmspecific work experience is often called seniority or tenure and allows a
worker to be more flexible or productive in the workplace (Budig and
England 2001, 205). Workers with higher levels of seniority may be
given raises and promotions because they are more knowledgeable,
productive, or just because they have been with the company for an
extended period of time (Budig and England 2001, 206).
The need or desire to work part-time may force a woman to leave a
job in which she is well matched (Anderson et. al. 2002, 354) to accept
a job that does not use her abilities or education. Since higher-ability
individuals with more education are typically rewarded with higher
wages, jobs that do not require either of these characteristics will
typically pay lower wages, all else equal.
Regardless of a mother’s status as a full-time or part-time worker, the
needs of a child may reduce the number of hours she is able to provide
market labor. Doctor’s appointments and care of a sick child often
become a mother’s responsibilities (Budig and England 2001, 207). Lack
of childcare may also reduce the amount of time a mother is able to spend
at work. Absences reduce the number of hours of work experience a
mother is able to accrue, but may also signal to employers that she is less
dedicated to her work than her childless counterpart. This signal may
create a negative impression resulting in fewer raises or promotions.
Mothers may be less motivated or provide less effort towards market
labor than non-mothers. In labor studies this is often called unobserved
heterogeneity. It means that mothers and non-mothers are inherently
different from each other in regard to characteristics that cannot be
directly observed. Intuitively this means that once a woman has children,
her behavior will change. It is reasonable to think that some women may
become less career-driven after the birth of a child. Other women,
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however, may be encouraged to work harder after bearing children
because they are then financially responsible for someone besides
themselves. Also, since the mother is traditionally the primary caregiver
of a family, her domestic responsibilities may grow substantially
following the birth of a child. An infant or toddler may leave his mother
without a full night’s sleep causing physical and mental fatigue. Even as
children age, they require attention and energy that often comes from their
mothers. The question then becomes: as a group, are mothers different
then non-mothers when it comes to motivation and effort? Using a fixed
effects model on individual mothers and non-mothers over a period of
time, Waldfogel finds no evidence that mothers “systematically differ
from non-mothers in ways that are not observed and that would affect
their wages” (1997, 215).
Marital status is often controlled for in family gap studies. One
reason might be that a mother’s marital status may affect how much effort
she is able to provide to her labor market activities. For example, a
married mother can typically depend to some degree on her husband to
help with the household or the children. Splitting the domestic
responsibilities in this way frees some of a mother’s energy or time for
market labor (Budig and England 2001, 211). Depending on custody
arrangements, a divorced mother may find that she has increased leisure
time which may affect her wages positively. Single (never married)
mothers are not likely to have either of these advantages. One researcher
hypothesizes that the positive effect of marriage or divorce on wages is
due to unobserved heterogeneity (Waldfogel 1997, 215-216). Not all
studies find a positive effect of marriage on mothers’ wages though.
Budig and England find a larger wage penalty for married mothers (2001,
204).
Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1978, 1988, and
1994, Waldfogel finds that a mother’s marital status does affect her
wages. All mothers are paid less than non-mothers on average, but
Waldfogel discovers that wages of married mothers are most comparable
to those of non-mothers. Single mothers have the lowest wages not only
in comparison to non-mothers, but in comparison to married and
previously married mothers as well. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of
Waldfogel’s study is the substantial decline she reports in the relative
wages of single mothers over time. This decline, combined with the
slight gains made by married mothers over this period, results in a
widening wage gap among mothers (1998, 144).
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Using data adapted from Waldfogel’s study, Figure 1 presents the
ratios of mothers’ to non-mothers’ wages in 1978, 1988, and 1994.
Mothers’ wages are divided into categories according to marital status.
In 1978 the wage gap among mothers was relatively small with single
mothers making approximately 92 percent of married mothers’ wages. By
1994 single mothers were much worse off as they were paid only 74
percent of married mothers’ wages (1998, 144). It is important to note
that although we can observe the changes in the relative wages of mothers
and non-mothers over time, we cannot make assumptions about why it has
occurred. Single mothers may, on average, receive higher welfare
benefits than in the past making it less necessary to maximize labor
wages. Or, since there is some evidence that unobserved heterogeneity
exists between women of different marital statuses, it is possible that
single mothers and married mothers have become increasingly dissimilar
over time. It is not clear if Waldfogel controlled for any human capital
characteristics, so if single mothers have less overall education or
experience than married mothers or non-mothers then it should be
expected that their relative wages are lower.

It is also possible that these results are biased. In comparison to all
mothers, married mothers are the least likely to need to work outside of
the home as many of them can rely on their husbands’ incomes (Budig
and England 2001, 211). If a married mother does not need to work but
chooses to do so anyway, one reason she might make this is decision is if
she has the ability to earn high wages. Waldfogel’s regression results
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may be biased if married woman who have the ability to earn the highest
wages choose to work while married women with the ability to earn only
low wages opt out of the labor market.
If a mother does have less motivation or provides less effort towards
her job, it may also be true that mothers are less productive (Budig and
England 2001, 204). Although it would be difficult to measure under
most circumstances, it is possible that assuming the bulk of the childcare
or domestic responsibilities may leave a woman tired or less focused as
her attention is split among her many other responsibilities (Budig and
England 2001, 204). If mothers are truly less productive then we are not
comparing wages ceteris paribus.
One study attempts to measure whether mothers are as productive as
non-mothers. Kalist uses data from the Ladies Professional Golf
Association from 1980 to 2004 to examine this issue. The benefit of
using this particular data set is that the earnings of women in the LPGA
are not subject to discrimination as they are paid according to relative
performance (2008, 219). The disadvantage is that it may be
inappropriate to apply the results of the professional athletes in this study
to women in more typical occupations.
Kalist finds that motherhood decreases earnings by decreasing
performance. He goes one step further by testing whether a woman
chooses to become a mother because her performance is declining or if
her performance declines because she became a mother. Kalist finds no
evidence to support the idea that women become mothers because their
careers are already in decline (2008, 234).
Mothers may be discriminated against by employers (Budig and
England 2001, 204). Several possible explanations for this exist.
Mothers may be held to higher standards than their childless counterparts
(Correll 2007, 1316). Some companies, in an effort to increase the
number of women in the workplace, may place pressure on managers to
hire more women, many of whom may be mothers. Managers may be
resentful of being forced to hire people who they believe are not the best
candidates for the job. Mothers may simply be seen as less committed to
market labor (Correll 2007, 1319). However plausible it seems that
mothers are discriminated against by employers, there is no hard evidence
that this is actually the case (Waldfogel 1998, 149). Family gap research
would benefit from further study in this area.
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III. Data and Model
This cross-sectional study is a modified version of Jane Waldfogel’s 1998
model. Over 187,000 observations were collected from the 2008
American Community Survey (ACS). The sample used includes only
currently employed women 19-70 years of age. Wages in the 2008 ACS
are reported as an individual’s pre-tax work income for 2007 measured
in 2007 dollars. Because wages are reported from the previous year,
women who indicated that they are currently employed but did not report
positive income were excluded from the study. Women actively engaged
in formal education were excluded from the sample because their wages
may not be representative of their true ability to earn.
Sociologist and family gap researcher Jane Waldfogel points out a
drawback of cross-sectional studies: “…women for whom the negative
effect of children is the greatest are the least likely to be employed and
are also the least likely to be part of any given cross-sectional sample of
labor-market participants” (1997, 211-212). She suggests using a pooled
data set over a longer period of time to get a clearer idea of the true effect
of children on mothers’ wages. Comparing regression results found by
using pooled data sets with cross-sectional studies, Waldfogel finds that
the magnitude of cross-sectional coefficients is lower, possibly due to a
selection bias (1997, 211-212). The goal of this study is to use a different
and more current data set to determine if the negative effects of children
on mothers’ wages are still apparent. Cross-sectional data is adequate for
this purpose.
The goal of this study is to determine if motherhood lowers a
woman’s wages. In this model the natural log of wages is the dependent
variable. The empirical model is as follows:
LNWAGE = CONSTANT + $1 CHU1 + $2 1CH6 + $3 O1CH + $4 2PCH
+ $5 AGE + $6AGESQ + $7MARR + $8WID + $9SEP + $10 DIV +
$11 #PHH + $12 ENGPROF + $13 HISP + $14 ASN + $15 BLK + $16 ONW +
$17 PWEXP + $18 PEXPSQ + $19 YRSED + $20 HH + ,
CHU1 is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a woman has a
child under the age of one year and 0 otherwise. I will refer to these
children as “babies.” The ACS provides the ages of a woman’s eldest
and youngest children. Specific ages are given for children one year or
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older. Otherwise, a child is listed as “less than 1.” Each individual is
determined to have a baby if she indicates that either the eldest or
youngest child is under the age of one. A baby brings challenges that
children of other ages typically do not. The physical and emotional
recovery associated with pregnancy and childbirth, the difficulties
involved in learning to care for a new baby and finding suitable childcare,
and an erratic sleep schedule are a few of these challenges. Mothers of
babies are expected to have less time, energy, and motivation to devote
to their jobs. Because of this, the coefficient on CHU1 is expected to be
negative.
1CH6 is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a mother has a
child one year or older but under the age of six years. 1CH6 has a value
of 0 otherwise. I will refer to these children as “preschoolers.” Once
again, the ages of the eldest and youngest children were used to determine
whether a mother had a preschooler. Similar to the CHU1 variable,
preschoolers present a unique set of challenges. Children tend to cost
more at this age in terms of time and money. For example, preschools are
often expensive relative to public elementary schools. Also, schooling for
preschoolers is often only part of the day which requires a working
mother to pay for both preschool and childcare. Finding someone
available to transport the child to and from preschool can be expensive
and challenging. To accommodate the difficult scheduling and
transportation, mothers may be more likely to work part-time during this
period. While infants are sedentary, preschoolers are not. Mothers of
preschoolers spend more time entertaining their children and making sure
they are safe. For these reasons, the coefficient on 1CH6 is also expected
to be negative.
O1CH is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a mother has only
one child and 0 otherwise. Because the total number of a mother’s
children is not reported in the ACS, the ages of the eldest and youngest
children are used once again. If the ages of the eldest and youngest
children were equal then the mother was determined to have only one
child. This measurement may be a source of error in the model because
a woman may have had a pregnancy resulting in multiple births or
children less than one year apart. A woman with twins, for example,
might show up in the sample as having only one child. Intuitively it
would seem that a mother with multiple children of the same age would
bias the estimated coefficient further away from zero than would a mother
with a single child. Mothers of children with chronic illnesses or
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disabilities may also bias the coefficient further away from zero. A
mother with one child who also provides care for foster children,
stepchildren, or grandchildren may also bias the magnitude of the O1CH
coefficient upward. Because children over the age of 19 years were not
treated as children in this model, a woman with multiple children but only
one under the age of 19 was determined to have only one child.
The O1CH variable is included because the transition from having no
children to having one is typically the most difficult for a woman. A
mother’s labor market choices change due to the arrival of the first child
rather than subsequent children. For this reason, O1CH is expected to
have a negative effect on a mother’s wages. If a significant number of
mothers providing care for children who are not their own or mothers
with multiple births, chronically ill, or disabled children appear in the
sample, then the magnitude of this coefficient may be biased upward.
2PCH is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a mother has two
or more children and 0 otherwise. Once again, due to the lack of data on
the exact number of children a woman has, eldest and youngest children’s
ages were used. A mother was determined to have two or more children
if the age of the eldest child was not equal to the age of the youngest
child. This variable is limited in its ability to predict wages in several
ways. First, having the actual number of children in a household would
have been preferred. For example, in this model a woman with two
children is treated the same as a woman with eight children. Second,
having access to the variance of the ages of the children may improve the
results significantly. For example, a mother with two year old twins and
a 16 year old will appear the same as a mother with a two year old and 16
year old twins even though the latter may have more household
assistance. The coefficient on 2PCH is expected to be negative.
AGE and AGESQ are the reported age in years and the square of the
reported age of a woman in the sample. Income is expected to increase
as age increases, but the returns to age are diminishing. Therefore, the
coefficient on AGE is expected to be positive, but the coefficient on
AGESQ is expected to be negative.
MARR, WID, SEP, and DIV are a series of dummy variables
controlling for whether an individual is married, widowed, separated, or
divorced. Single/Never married is left out of the regression as the omitted
category. Previous studies have found that being married is positively
correlated with wages, which is the expected relationship here as well
(Waldfogel 1997, 211-212, Waldfogel 1998, 147). The coefficients on
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SEP and DIV are also expected to be positive. Women who are separated
or divorced are likely to feel that it is necessary to work. Mothers may
find that they have more free time when they are separated or divorced
due to custody arrangements. They may use this newly acquired free time
to better educate themselves or work. The expected coefficient on WID
is ambiguous. A widowed woman may have increased motivation to earn
higher wages, or she may have had no preparation for labor force
participation resulting in low wages.
#PHH is the number of people who reportedly live in the household.
A greater number of people living in a household may be able to split
domestic responsibilities among themselves. This may allow a mother
more time and energy to provide market labor or seek education. People
don’t necessarily split domestic labor equally though, so more people in
the household may mean more work for the primary caregiver. Also, it
is impossible to tell from the data set what the relationship of the people
living in the household are to each other. A higher number for #PHH may
indicate more children in the household or more adults that are willing to
help with household labor. I anticipate that the potential for more
division of domestic labor will be relatively small, resulting in a negative
coefficient on #PHH.
ENGPROF is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a woman is
considered proficient in English and 0 otherwise. The ACS allows five
classifications in which respondents may indicate their ability to speak
English. Only an individual who says that she “speaks only English” or
“speaks [English] very well” is considered proficient in English for this
study. Women with better communication skills are likely to have higher
wages, so the coefficient on ENGPROF is expected to be positive.
HISP, ASN, BLK, and ONW are a series of dummy variables
controlling for race as Hispanic, Asian, Black, and other races that are not
considered white. The control for white women is the omitted category.
I anticipate that the coefficient on BLK will be negative as many AfricanAmericans earn less on average. Asian- Americans are often found to be
highly skilled which would indicate higher wages. Minorities often have
relatively low wages on average. For these reasons, the expected
coefficient on ASN is positive while the expected coefficients on HISP
and ONW are negative.
PWEXP and PEXPSQ are variables that indicate the amount of
potential work experience in years and the amount of potential work
experience squared. Wages are expected to increase as actual work
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experience increases (Waldfogel 1997, 211). The ACS does not provide
information in regard to how long an individual has actually worked, so
potential work experience is used as a proxy for actual work experience.
Potential work experience is calculated by subtracting the number of
years of schooling from an individual’s age and then subtracting five.
The argument is that individuals five and younger or in school are not
gaining work experience.
There is a great deal of room for error in this particular estimate.
Since potential work experience is often a proxy for actual work
experience in labor studies, one researcher determines the relationship
between the two measurements for her sample. She finds that “actual
work experience is about two-thirds of potential work experience, but this
ratio varies a great deal by family status” (Waldfogel 1997, 211).
Mothers who leave the labor market to focus on domestic responsibilities
and then return to the labor market years later will be overestimated for
work experience. We are trying to determine the cause of mothers’ lower
wages, but they are the people for whom we may have the poorest
estimate of work experience (Waldfogel 1997, 210). Women who choose
part-time work will also be overestimated in terms of work experience.
Older women with the least amount of education will have the highest
levels of potential work experience. Younger women with more
education will have the lowest levels of potential work experience and
thus the lowest predicted wages. Although this measurement is far from
perfect, some measure of experience should be accounted for in the
model. Actual work experience is expected to have a positive coefficient
and actual work experience squared is expected to have a negative
coefficient. Since PWEXP and PEXPSQ are proxy variables with severe
limitations, the expected signs on the coefficients are ambiguous.
YRSED indicates the number of years each woman spent in formal
education. The ACS provides an extensive list of educational attainment
options. The options were then subjectively quantified as to the typical
number of corresponding years that each particular level of education
would require. Because this is a control variable and not the focus of this
study, I will omit the specifications. Income is expected to increase as the
number of years of education increase. Women who invest more in
education may also be more likely to remain committed to their careers
and less likely to bear children. The coefficient on the YRSED variable
is expected to be positive.
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HH is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a woman indicates that
she is the head of the household and 0 otherwise. A woman who
considers herself the head of the household may be more likely to feel
financially responsible for the household. As a result, she may exhibit
more motivation and effort towards her labor market activities. A woman
who is the head of the household may also have more domestic
responsibilities. For these reasons, the expected sign on the coefficient
for HH is ambiguous.
A variety of control variables have been used in the regression in an
effort to improve the results. Seven variables were added to control for
geographic region. It seems plausible that in some areas of the country,
the New England states for example, the average wages may be higher
than in other areas. Ten variables were included to control for industry
because it is likely that women working in certain industries, like
engineering for example, are paid higher wages than other women. The
last control variable included in the regression indicates whether a woman
lives in a larger city. Wages are expected to be higher on average in
larger cities.
The following is general information about the sample used for this
study: The ACS data provide the age of an individual’s eldest and
youngest child. If a woman indicates that her children are 19 years old or
older, then she is considered to be a non-mother in this model. There are
several arguments for this assumption. First, older children are typically
more independent and do not require the same level of care that younger
children do. For this reason, older children are assumed to have less
effect on their mothers’ current wages. Second, children 19 years old or
older are more likely to live away from home where they do not add to the
domestic responsibilities of their mothers. Obviously, these reasons do
not hold true for every mother/child relationship. Some mothers are more
inclined to maintain a more constant level of involvement in their
children’s lives regardless of the age of their children. Also, older
children with disabilities may remain with their mothers longer and
require a higher level of involvement throughout their lives. And still
other children just aren’t motivated to leave their mothers’ homes until
they are much older. On average though, older children will have less
affect on a mother’s ability to earn.
One study finds that even when children are not living in their
mothers’ homes they still negatively affect her wages (Waldfogel 1997,
211). This indicates that the effect of children on their mothers’ wages
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may be permanent. Finally, older children may be more helpful in regard
to helping care for younger siblings, domestic responsibilities and may
serve as a source of moral support for their mothers. Therefore, in this
model, mothers with only older children are assumed to be more similar
to non-mothers than they are to mothers with younger children.

IV. Results
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in this
regression. The average wage reported was $40,070.23. Mothers made
up approximately 40 percent of the sample. The average age was close
to 44 years, and 58 percent of the sample was married. 90 percent of the
sample was proficient in English, and 75 percent was white. Respondents
were able to choose multiple races to describe themselves, so the sum of
the means for the race variables is greater than 100 percent. The mean
number of years of education was 15, indicating that the average woman
represented in the sample has less than a Bachelor’s degree.
TABLE 1–Summary Statistics
Variable
Wages (2007 dollars)

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

40070.23

39955.09

4.00

662971.00

CHU1

0.0264

0.1602

0.0000

1.0000

1CH6

0.1174

0.3219

0.0000

1.0000

O1CH

0.1909

0.3930

0.0000

1.0000

2PCH

0.1991

0.3993

0.0000

1.0000

AGE

43.8797

12.2001

19.0000

70.0000

2074.2720

1069.3160

361.0000

4900.0000

SNM

0.2053

0.4039

0.0000

1.0000

MARR

0.5838

0.4929

0.0000

1.0000

WID

0.0310

0.1732

0.0000

1.0000

SEP

0.0253

0.1571

0.0000

1.0000

DIV

0.1546

0.3615

0.0000

1.0000

#PHH

2.9973

1.5725

1.0000

20.0000

ENGPROF

0.9010

0.2986

0.0000

1.0000

AGESQ
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Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

WHT

0.7583

0.4281

0.0000

1.0000

HISP

0.1606

0.3672

0.0000

1.0000

ASN

0.0815

0.2736

0.0000

1.0000

BLK

0.1090

0.3117

0.0000

1.0000

ONW

0.0728

0.2598

0.0000

1.0000

PWEXP

22.8777

12.5771

0.0000

64.0000

PEXPSQ

681.5726

598.4112

0.0000

4096.0000

YRSED

15.0106

2.9491

0.0000

22.0000

HH

0.4837

0.4997

0.0000

1.0000

East South Central

0.1553

0.3622

0.0000

1.0000

New England

0.0374

0.1897

0.0000

1.0000

South Atlantic

0.2876

0.4527

0.0000

1.0000

East South Central

0.0441

0.2053

0.0000

1.0000

West South Central

0.0267

0.1612

0.0000

1.0000

Mountain

0.1195

0.3244

0.0000

1.0000

Pacific

0.3293

0.4700

0.0000

1.0000

2095.2540

7747.6670

0.0000

38494.0000

Business/Finance

0.1530

0.3600

0.0000

1.0000

STEM

0.0332

0.1792

0.0000

1.0000

Education/Media

0.1498

0.3568

0.0000

1.0000

Health/Protection

0.1318

0.3382

0.0000

1.0000

Food/Service/Sales

0.2239

0.4169

0.0000

1.0000

Administration

0.2387

0.4263

0.0000

1.0000

Farm/Construction

0.0073

0.0849

0.0000

1.0000

Repair/Production

0.0168

0.1287

0.0000

1.0000

Manufacturing

0.0256

0.1578

0.0000

1.0000

Transportation

0.0200

0.1399

0.0000

1.0000

City population

The regression results are presented in Table 2. Variables indicating
that a mother has either a preschooler or a baby were not found to be
significant. A possible explanation is that it may require more time for
a mother’s wages to react to her change in family status (Budig and
England, 2001, 206). The variable denoting that a woman is of Hispanic
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origin is significant at the 5 percent level. All other variables are
significant at the 1 percent level.
There are several perverse signs in the regression results. The first is
the marital status variable for separated. The expectation was that the
signs on the coefficients for separated and divorced variables would be
the same and positive as discussed previously. It is possible that divorced
women may perceive their change in living arrangements as permanent
and have had time to adapt to that change. The feeling of financial
independence may provide divorced women the incentive to improve their
money-making opportunities where they are able. It is possible that
separated women are dealing with the uncertainty of what the future
holds. The feeling of instability in their lives may contribute negatively
to their earnings.
The second perverse sign is on the variable indicating that a woman
is of Hispanic origin. The regression reports a positive coefficient but the
expected sign was negative. The coefficient is quite small and is only
significant at the 5 percent level. The unanticipated sign may possibly
indicate that the Hispanic women in this sample are hard workers on
average.
The third perverse sign is on the variable indicating years of
education. The coefficient for the variable was expected to be positive as
it is typically understood that wages increase as education increases.
There is no intuitive explanation for the negative sign on this coefficient.
An earlier study shows that mothers with higher levels of education are
penalized more for having children then women with lower levels of
education (Waldfogel 1997, 216). It is possible that there is a connection
between the two findings. The ACS data does not indicate whether each
woman is working full-time or part-time. If many of the highly educated
women are working part-time or have more non-wage income, then their
wages may appear artificially low, resulting in a perverse sign on
education. Additionally, women with low levels of education and high
wages may alter the sign on the education coefficient.
The most important variables to this study are O1CH and 2PCH
which together indicate whether a woman is a mother or a non-mother.
Both of the coefficients on these variables are negative as expected. The
regression results show that even after controlling for age, marital status,
race, education, industry, and geographic location, an American mother
who has one child will have 7.2 percent lower wages. If a mother in the
United States has two or more children her wages will be 15.4 percent
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lower on average.
TABLE 2–Regression Results
Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error

T-Ratio

P-Value

Constant**

5.1698

0.1098

47.0900

0.0000

CHU1

0.0123

0.0125

0.9800

0.3260

1CH6

0.0027

0.0072

0.3800

0.7070

O1CH**

-0.0695

0.0059

-11.7900

0.0000

2PCH**

-0.1432

0.0072

-19.9600

0.0000

AGE**

0.3835

0.0168

22.7600

0.0000

AGESQ**

-0.0016

0.0000

-54.9700

0.0000

MARR**

0.0244

0.0061

4.0100

0.0000

WID**

-0.0993

0.0126

-7.8800

0.0000

SEP**

-0.0946

0.0132

-7.1700

0.0000

DIV**

0.0428

0.0073

5.8500

0.0000

#PHH**

-0.0308

0.0016

-18.9900

0.0000

ENGPROF**

0.1420

0.0078

18.2300

0.0000

HISP*

0.0167

0.0067

2.5000

0.0120

ASN**

0.0600

0.0078

7.6400

0.0000

BLK**

-0.0646

0.0066

-9.8100

0.0000

ONW**

-0.0301

0.0084

-3.6100

0.0000

PWEXP**

-0.2661

0.0168

-15.8000

0.0000

PEXPSQ**

0.0006

0.0000

21.2500

0.0000

YRSED**

-0.1640

0.0167

-9.8200

0.0000

HH**

0.1194

0.0044

27.120

0.0000

New England**

0.1857

0.0111

16.6600

0.0000

South Atlantic**

0.0422

0.0062

6.7800

0.0000

East South Central**

-0.0874

0.0105

-8.3300

0.0000

West South Central**

-0.1015

0.0128

-7.9200

0.0000

Mountain

-0.0090

0.0075

-1.1900

0.2320

Pacific**

0.1629

0.0062

26.3000

0.0000

City population**

0.0000

0.0000

9.9400

0.0000
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Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error

T-Ratio

P-Value

STEM

0.0120

0.0117

1.0200

0.3070

Education/Media**

-0.4841

0.0071

-68.4500

0.0000

Health/Protection**

-0.2370

0.0073

-32.6000

0.0000

Food/Service/Sales**

-0.7692

0.0067

-114.6300

0.0000

Administration**

-0.4534

0.0065

-70.2600

0.0000

Farm/Construction**

-0.6258

0.0235

-26.5800

0.0000

Repair/Production**

-0.3946

0.0159

-24.8100

0.0000

Manufacturing**

-0.5252

0.0135

-38.9400

0.0000

Transportation**
Number of Observations
Adjusted R squared

-0.6894
187,392
0.2553

0.0148

-46.6500

0.0000

**Significant at the 1% level
* Significant at the 5% level

As stated previously, PWEXP and PEXPSQ are proxy variables
intended to estimate actual work experience in the model. The
coefficients on these proxy variables differ from what is expected for the
actual variables. Because of this, an additional regression omitting
PWEXP and PEXPSQ was run. The regression results are presented in
Table 3.
TABLE 3–Regression Results Omitting PWEXP and PEXPSQ
Variable
Constant**
CHU1*
1CH6
O1CH**
2PCH**
AGE**
AGESQ**
MARR**
WID**
SEP**

Coefficient
7.3768
0.0288
0.0117
-0.0744
-0.1509
0.0985
-0.0011
0.0298
-0.0859
-0.0949

Standard
Error
0.0299
0.0125
0.0072
0.0059
0.0072
0.0012
0.0000
0.0061
0.0126
0.0132

T-Ratio

P-Value

247.0100
2.3000
1.6300
-12.6000
-21.0300
80.3300
-77.9100
4.8800
-6.8100
-7.1900

0.0000
0.0220
0.1020
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
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Variable

Coefficient

DIV**
#PHH**
ENGPROF**
HISP*
ASN**
BLK**
ONW**
YRSED**
HH**
New England**
South Atlantic**
East South Central**
West South Central**
Mountain
Pacific**
City population**
STEM*
Education/Media**
Health/Protection**
Food/Service/Sales**
Administration**
Farm/Construction**
Repair/Production**
Manufacturing**
Transportation**
Number of Observations
Adjusted R squared

0.0414
-0.0335
0.1405
0.0154
0.0714
-0.0661
-0.0315
0.0714
0.1216
0.1834
0.0421
-0.0885
-0.1033
-0.0108
0.1609
0.0000
0.0237
-0.4803
-0.2379
-0.7752
-0.4596
-0.6358
-0.3999
-0.5260
-0.6969
187,392
0.2528

Standard
Error
0.0073
0.0016
0.0078
0.0067
0.0078
0.0066
0.0084
0.0008
0.0044
0.0112
0.0062
0.0105
0.0128
0.0075
0.0062
0.0000
0.0117
0.0071
0.0073
0.0067
0.0065
0.0236
0.0159
0.0135
0.0148
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T-Ratio

P-Value

5.6500
-20.6700
18.0200
2.3100
9.1100
-10.0300
-3.7700
89.2200
27.6000
16.4200
6.7500
-8.4200
-8.0500
-1.4300
25.9300
10.8100
2.0200
-67.8100
-32.6600
-115.4200
-71.1600
-26.9700
-25.1000
-38.9400
-47.0900

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0210
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1530
0.0000
0.0000
0.0430
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

**Significant at the 1% level
* Significant at the 5% level

The results for the second regression do not differ significantly from the
first. There are, however, several points of interest. First, the variable
controlling for whether a woman has a baby is now significant at the 5
percent level and has a positive coefficient. This means that if a woman
has a baby she earns more on average than a woman without a baby. As
previously discussed, wages are not necessarily expected to react
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immediately to a woman having a baby (Budig and England, 2001, 206).
Women with higher earnings may be more likely to continue working
after the birth of a child which may explain the sign on this coefficient.
Second, AGE has a much smaller coefficient in comparison to the first
regression. Because age was used to determine PWEXP and PEXPSQ,
multicolinearity between these variables in the first regression may
account for the change in the size of the AGE coefficient in the second
regression. Third, the control for the STEM (Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics) industry is significant at the 5 percent
level in the second regression and has a positive coefficient as expected.
Finally, the coefficient on YRSED is now positive as originally expected.
Like the differences in the AGE coefficients, YRSED may have changed
due to multicolinearity issues with PWEXP and PEXPSQ in the first
regression.
The most important aspect of the second regression is that the
variables O1CH and 2PCH are still significant at the 1 percent level and
retain their negative coefficients. The coefficient on O1CH is -.0744.
This indicates that a woman with one child is paid 7.7 percent less than
an otherwise comparable non-mother. The coefficient on 2PCH is -.1509
and means that a mother with two or more children is paid 16.3 percent
less than her childless counterpart.

V. Conclusion
The family-induced wage gap among women exists in the United States.
Research has repeatedly found that even after controlling for a host of
demographic and human capital characteristics, a gap in wages remains
between mothers and non-mothers. This study has used data from a
different source than previous studies and has used more current data as
well. Like previous studies, I find that a single child decreases his
mother’s wages by 7 to 8 percent, and two or more children decrease their
mother’s wage by 15 to 16 percent.
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